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Abstract
Background: The Czech Republic has one of the poorest tobacco control records in Europe. This paper examines
transnational tobacco companies’ (TTCs’) efforts to influence policy there, paying particular attention to excise policies, as
high taxes are one of the most effective means of reducing tobacco consumption, and tax structures are an important
aspect of TTC competitiveness.
Methods and Findings: TTC documents dating from 1989 to 2004/5 were retrieved from the Legacy Tobacco Documents
Library website, analysed using a socio-historical approach, and triangulated with key informant interviews and secondary
data. The documents demonstrate significant industry influence over tobacco control policy. Philip Morris (PM) ignored,
overturned, and weakened various attempts to restrict tobacco advertising, promoting voluntary approaches as an
alternative to binding legislation. PM and British American Tobacco (BAT) lobbied separately on tobacco tax structures, each
seeking to implement the structure that benefitted its own brand portfolio over that of its competitors, and enjoying
success in turn. On excise levels, the different companies took a far more collaborative approach, seeking to keep tobacco
taxes low and specifically to prevent any large tax increases. Collective lobbying, using a variety of arguments, was
successful in delaying the tax increases required via European Union accession. Contrary to industry arguments, data show
that cigarettes became more affordable post-accession and that TTCs have taken advantage of low excise duties by raising
prices. Interview data suggest that TTCs enjoy high-level political support and continue to actively attempt to influence
policy.
Conclusion: There is clear evidence of past and ongoing TTC influence over tobacco advertising and excise policy. We
conclude that this helps explain the country’s weak tobacco control record. The findings suggest there is significant scope
for tobacco tax increases in the Czech Republic and that large (rather than small, incremental) increases are most effective in
reducing smoking.
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Introduction
The collapse of communism in 1989 prompted the split of
Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993 [1].
It also prompted economic reforms that led to the privatisation of
the state-run tobacco monopolies, Tabak Akciova´ Spolecˇnost
(hereinafter referred to as ‘‘Tabak’’) in the Czech Republic and
Cˇeskoslovensky´ Tabakovy´ Priemysel in Slovakia. This provided
opportunities for transnational tobacco companies (TTCs), which
are known to have exploited privatisation processes elsewhere
[2,3,4,5].
More recently, in 2004, the Czech Republic joined the
European Union (EU), which brought with it a requirement to
implement EU Directives on tobacco control [6]. Despite this,
tobacco control remains weak in the Czech Republic. Between
1990 and 2000, real cigarette prices fell [7] and in 2010, its
tobacco control policies were ranked the fourth least effective in
Europe [8]. Furthermore, senior political figures publically support
the tobacco industry. For example, while opening Philip Morris’
(PM) Kutna Hora factory in September 2010, the Czech President
Vaclav Klaus commended PM’s contribution to the country and
challenged EU tobacco regulations, reportedly stating: ‘‘I support
the fight against restrictions on smoking. […] This is stupid; it is
unreasonable and something that politicians should not do’’ [9].
The Czech Republic also remains the only EU Member State that
has not yet ratified the Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control (FCTC). Despite this worrying state of tobacco control, no
previous studies have examined tobacco industry influence in the
Czech Republic.
This paper addresses this gap. Examining the period from 1989
onwards (thus covering the key political events of privatisation and
EU accession), it aims to explore three main issues: (i) the tactics of
market entry; (ii) TTC influence on tobacco marketing restrictions;
and (iii) TTC influence on tobacco taxation in the Czech
Republic. In so doing, it aims to improve understanding of both
effective excise policy and the ways in which TTCs seek to
influence policy in emerging markets. Taxation is of particular
interest because it is highly effective in reducing tobacco
consumption [10,11,12,13] and raises revenue for governments
[14,15]. It also influences TTCs’ competitiveness, because
different excise systems favour different brand portfolios (the
collection of brands that each company sells, usually across a range
of price segments; see Table 1). Nevertheless, only a limited
literature explores TTCs’ efforts to influence tax policies, and most
studies focus on North America and deal exclusively with tax levels
[16].
Methods
This study used a qualitative design, which centred on analysing
internal tobacco industry documents released through a series of
litigation cases in the US. These data were supported by, and
triangulated with, an analysis of other publicly available
documents and nine interviews with key informants. The tobacco
industry documents were searched via the Legacy Tobacco
Documents Library website (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/).
The date range was restricted to 1989 onwards (covering
privatisation and accession to the EU), although undated
documents were also included. A broad initial search using the
following string: Czech* AND (tax OR taxation OR excise OR
‘‘ad valorem’’) yielded 4,785 documents, all of which were briefly
examined. The surrounding Bates numbers of particularly relevant
documents were also checked. Relevant documents were down-
loaded to an EndNote library and analysed in chronological order,
after which further searches were undertaken to follow up specific
events, organisations, and individuals. As the initial analysis
indicated that TTCs had also been involved in influencing non-tax
policies, notably tobacco advertising bans, additional searches also
focused on these activities. 511 documents were analysed in detail,
using the tobacco document methodology developed by Gilmore
[17], which is informed by a socio-historical approach [18,19].
The majority of documents identified as relevant to this work were
PM and British American Tobacco (BAT) documents. This
reflects both the nature of the document collections (access to TTC
documents is limited mainly to those of PM and BAT, as
documents of companies that were not party to the US litigation
are not publically available) and the fact that these two companies
have dominated the Czech market since transition. The most
recent, relevant document identified was dated 2004/5, although
only 32 documents date from 2000 onwards.
Additional data sources, including tobacco industry journals,
newspaper articles (obtained via Nexis database searches), and
market reports (e.g. Euromonitor, ERC Statistics) were used to
triangulate this analysis and to provide more recent data. Semi-
structured, key informant interviews were undertaken in Novem-
ber 2010. Interviews were conducted face-to-face in Czech by a
native Czech speaker with tobacco control expertise. Potential
interviewees were selected by a snowball technique; eight out of 11
individuals approached agreed to be interviewed and for their
interview to be recorded. Attempts were made to include all
relevant stakeholder groups, and we were successful in interview-
ing a broad spectrum including a public health expert, a civil
servant, a tobacco industry representative, a politician, and a
political advisor. The primary topics in the interview schedule
included changes to and influences on excise policy at EU and
national levels including individual and collective efforts of the
TTCs to influence policy, dealings with the tobacco industry or
third parties representing the industry, provision of advice on
tobacco control policy, tobacco smuggling, industry pricing
strategies, EU accession negotiations and influence thereon, and
the FCTC. Interview transcripts were analysed using the
Framework approach [20,21], in which qualitative data are coded
and organised according to themes and sub-themes, allowing for
the incorporation of both a priori themes and those which emerge
through the analytical process. Observations from interview notes
were used to help provide a context for the analysis.
Results
TTCs Entry to the Czech Market and Efforts to Achieve
Market Dominance
In 1991, the government commenced a process of privatising
the Czech and Slovak tobacco monopolies. Multiple TTCs (PM,
BAT, Reemtsma, Rothmans, and R.J. Reynolds [RJR]) prepared
to enter the market [22,23], which was deemed of strategic
importance because of its central European location, favourable
economic prospects, and borders with other former socialist
countries the TTCs hoped to access [24,25,26]. Both PM and
BAT perceived shaping the tobacco tax system as an important
step towards securing market share and future profits
[27,28,29,30].
Prior to market opening, legal TTC sales in Czechoslovakia
occurred only through hard currency and Duty Free Shops [31],
which were unavailable to the general population. However, by
1991, documents suggest that cigarette smuggling into Czechoslo-
vakia was commonplace; a BAT agent estimated that 70% of
Tobacco Industry Influence in the Czech Republic
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BAT’s and 90% of PM’s cigarettes on the market were
‘‘smuggled’’ [32]. Moreover, tobacco marketing was already
widespread with TTC brands among those heavily marketed [32].
In March 1992, in the western part of Czechoslovakia (now the
Czech Republic), Tabak was put out to tender [22,33]. PM, which
had a close working relationship with the Czechoslovakian
government and Tabak (through a licensing agreement established
in 1987 to produce PM’s most prominent brand, Marlboro
[34,35]), successfully convinced the government to abandon its
plan to break up Tabak [22,36,37]. In April 1992, PM acquired a
30% share (the largest US investment in the Czech history at the
time) [35] and by 1993, it had gained a majority holding (67.4%)
[27] and thus monopoly power over the domestic market.
The Czech government had planned to abolish the law giving
PM (via ownership of Tabak) a monopoly on cigarette production
[38] but, according to BAT, PM attempted to maintain its market
dominance by trying to impede this change [36,39,40]. BAT
repeatedly lobbied key government officials [39,41,42,43,44],
arguing that failure to change the legislation would ‘‘inhibit the
establishment’’ [40] of the ‘‘truly free market for tobacco
products’’ [40] to which the Czech government had committed
[40]. Documents suggest that BAT’s lobbying efforts (on which it
spent at least £120,000 by June 1993 [45]) were successful
[45,46,47,48,49], ultimately enabling BAT to establish a small
production facility in May 1995 [50,51].
PM therefore turned its attention to maintaining its market
leadership via other means [52]. A notable example is PM’s
support for and direct engagement with the Czech authorities to
introduce a tax stamp system in the mid-1990s [53,54,55,56],
demonstrating its apparent concern about ‘‘competition from
illegally imported cigarettes’’ [57], which included competitor
TTC brands [58]. To PM’s satisfaction [54], the tax stamp system
was implemented in 1994 and helped contain levels of contraband
at around 3% of sales for a few years [54,59].
TTC Efforts to Influence Marketing Restrictions
Prior to market entry, some marketing restrictions were
introduced in Czechoslovakia, notably a 1992 Consumer Protec-
tion Act, which stated that it was ‘‘forbidden to advertise tobacco
products’’ [60]. However, TTCs ignored this, posting large adverts
on billboards, store fronts, and city trams [61,62]. PM claimed that
the Act could not be enforced until officials had further defined it
[62] and pursued ‘‘all available means to obtain a favourable
amendment’’ [63,64,65,66,67]. It used a previously established
organisation, Libertad, which, although fully funded by PM,
positioned itself as not-for-profit [68,69,70]. Supported by the
Table 1. Tobacco excise structures and their effects on tobacco companies.
Excise
structure Characteristics Effects on companies
Specific N Levied as a fixed amount (per cigarette weight/pieces/pack/carton)
Advantages
N Ease of implementation
N Likely to ensure stable and predictable tax revenue
N Reduces the gap between cheap and expensive brands and thus
the motivation for down-trading
N Compared to ad valorem taxes, tends to encourage overshifting of
tax as any increase in price (over the tax increase) will be accrued in profit
N Specific tax increases tend to reduce consumption more than equivalent
ad valorem tax increases
Disadvantages
N Not automatically indexed for inflation and therefore needs
regular rate-adjustment
N If levied per pack/stick, can encourage TTCs to produce longer,
King-Size cigarettes without additional tax burden.
N TTCs selling expensive brands favour this structure because,
as a % of price, the burden on expensive cigarettes is lower
than on cheaper cigarettes & the price gap is narrowed. This
encourages smokers to smoke more expensive brands.
N TTCs can raise the base cigarette price (and thus their profit
margin) without a corresponding tax increase, as tax levels are
independent of retail price. Thus specific prices enable greater
profitability, certainly in established markets.
Ad-valorem N Levied as a percentage of price
Advantages
N Tax amount automatically indexed for inflation if the industry raises
its base price in line with inflation.
N An increase in profit margin or in the costs of inputs automatically
increases the amount of tax paid by consumers.
Disadvantages
N Tax revenues may not be as predictable and stable as specific taxes
(TTCs can adjust their cigarette prices to minimise their tax liability).
N Increases the price gap between cheap and expensive products,
which encourages product substitution after a price/tax increase thus
diminishing the impact of the tax increase.
N May encourage companies with expensive brands to reduce their
prices in order to minimise the price gap.
N TTCs with cheaper brands usually favour this structure, as it
can lead to a large price discrepancy between their cheap
brands and other, more expensive brands.
Mixed N Incorporates specific and ad valorem components
Advantages and disadvantages
N Mixed systems incorporate some of the advantages but also some
of the disadvantages of specific and ad valorem systems. The extent to
which they do so depends on whether they are weighted towards
specific or ad valorem elements.
N TTCs with brands of mid or broad price-range usually prefer
a mixed structure.
Tiered N Tobacco excise may also be tiered, with different tax levels applied
to different categories of tobacco product (categorised by, for example,
cigarette length, source of production, whether filtered or unfiltered).
N TTCs with brands that fall into the lower tax tiers usually
favour this structure, as it discriminates in their favour.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001248.t001
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global public relations company Burson-Marsteller [70], Libertad
helped frame freedom to advertise tobacco products as a matter of
commercial free speech [64,71,72]. The campaign was successful
and the advertising ban was formally cancelled in July 1993
[48,63]. PM subsequently worked to produce a voluntary code of
conduct [48,68,73], presumably to decrease the likelihood that
another legislative ban would be proposed (a tactic used elsewhere
[74]).
However, to PM’s apparent surprise, a further advertising ban
was passed in December 1993, which PM again worked ‘‘to
reverse’’ [53,75,76,77], promoting self-regulation as an alternative
[77]. In February 1994, a vote on relaxing the ban was passed,
allowing existing tobacco advertising contracts to run until
December 1994 or until a new law was passed [78,79], meaning
that, although tobacco advertising was technically banned, it still
existed throughout the country [61]. Just days prior to this vote,
PM had taken five Czech Members of Parliament (MPs) to a two-
day all-expenses paid ‘‘briefing trip’’ to Switzerland [77,80], where
a tobacco and alcohol advertising ban had recently been rejected
in a referendum vote following a PM campaign [81]. Two of these
parliamentarians voted in favour of amending the ban and the
others abstained or were absent [80]. Soon after the vote, the
Czech Prime Minister committed the government to completely
cancelling the advertising ban and seeking alternative legislation
[79].
The government started working on a new advertising law in
March 1994, and by April 1994, PM had become directly involved
with its development [77]. The new law was approved in October
and in line with PM’s objective, relied on self-regulation [77]. PM
managers regarded this as a success [77,82] and planned to use a
similar, voluntary code to try to overturn the advertising ban still
in place in Slovakia [82]. PM documents note that a ‘‘behind the
scenes approach’’ helped them achieve success [77]. A key
component of this approach was the establishment of the Council
for Advertising, an organisation made up of advertisers and the
media which was charged with administering an industry
marketing code, closely modelled on PM’s own internal code
[77,83]. At least two documents suggest PM was involved in
establishing the Council for Advertising [77,83] and another
suggests PM helped fund it [84].
By 1994–1995, the Czech Parliament approved an amendment
to the Law of Prevention of Alcoholism and Other Drug
Addictions, which included a ban on day-time TV and radio
advertising for tobacco products [85]. However, the law was
rejected by President Havel [86,87,88], following ‘‘several weeks of
intensive lobbying by the industry’’ [88].
TTC Efforts to Influence Tobacco Excise Policy
Influence on excise policy during privatisation. Both PM
and BAT tried to influence tax policy before, during, and after the
privatisation process and both generally wanted to minimise
tobacco tax levels [89,90,91,92]. However, each had different
approaches to excise tax structure, in line with their contrasting
brand portfolios [93,94,95,96]. PM’s portfolio is dominated by the
premium brand Marlboro. As fully specific excise structures
benefit expensive brands (Table 1), PM’s objective was to replace
the fully ad valorem (proportional) structure then in place (1989–
1990: see Table 2) [97] with an entirely specific excise tax structure
[93]. Although documents do not specify that a single-rate (i.e., not
tiered) specific system was the ultimate objective, we assume this
was the case from the objectives PM outline; the specific system
was intended to reduce the price gap between Marlboro and
others’ cheaper brands, in order to eliminate the cheaper brands’
‘‘price advantage’’ [93] and enable consumers ‘‘to choose their
cigarettes based on product quality and brand image rather than
price’’ (i.e. to choose its more expensive brands) [98]. Accordingly,
PM promoted a fully specific excise tax structure after its
acquisition of Tabak in 1992 [89].
BAT, which had a more diverse cigarette price portfolio with a
greater emphasis on the economy price segment than PM, wanted
to shape the excise tax structure differently [95,96]. We have been
unable to find any documents that clarify precisely what BAT
envisioned, but the company’s broad European strategy at this
time was to achieve a mixed excise structure (combining an ad
valorem tax with a significant specific component) [99,100]. Given
the rationale for this system was that it would disadvantage PM’s
more expensive brands [101], it is likely that BAT was trying to
achieve a mixed excise tax structure in the Czech Republic. By
1990, both companies were actively lobbying to influence excise
tax policy [25,102]. In 1991, BAT met with Mr. Antonin Kalina of
the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Finance to offer the company’s
‘‘worldwide tax experience’’ [103]. However, BAT’s lobbying
efforts were initially unsuccessful and a specific excise tax structure
was implemented in January 1991 (Table 2) [26], which continued
to disadvantage its brands [104].
Although the excise structure implemented in 1991 was specific
(in line with PM’s preferences), it also incorporated three tiers,
based on both geographical origin and length of cigarettes
(Table 2) [26]. This did not offer PM the advantages of a normal,
single-rate specific system (Table 1), given that both long cigarettes
(largely produced by TTCs) and imports (on which the TTCs then
relied [28,36]) were taxed most highly. In January 1991, PM
became concerned with the discriminatory effects of the tiered
structure on foreign brands, which ‘‘incur approximately double
the tax burden that is applied to domestic filter cigarettes’’ [28]
and claimed it contravened the principles of General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade because it discriminated against foreign
goods [28], a tactic PM had previously employed in Hungary
[28,105].
Although the tiered tax structure remained in place until 2001,
once PM had acquired Tabak, thereby starting to produce shorter
(lower taxed), local cigarette brands, the structure became
‘‘extremely beneficial to Philip Morris’’ [106]. Nevertheless, PM
remained unhappy with the significant price gap between
Marlboro and other brands [67], as it hindered its broader plan
for new markets: to buy up local brands with the long-term goal of
trading ‘‘consumers up to premium brands,’’ notably Marlboro
[107]. This would increase returns given the greater profit margins
generally enjoyed on premium brands. A predominantly specific
tax structure and a willingness to temporarily absorb tax increases
(to make Marlboro more affordable) were central to this strategy:
‘‘In expansion areas (excluding Japan) affordability is the key
issue and managing the price gap between Marlboro and the
next pricing category is the critical strategy. To do so
requires selective pricing including choosing to absorb tax
increases partially or in full.’’ [107]
Accordingly, PM lobbied the Ministries of Economic Compe-
tition and Finance and relevant parliamentary committees [48,63]
with apparent success. PM documents from 1993 and 1994 report
that the company obtained a reduction in the tax difference
between tiers by raising the tax burden on short cigarettes (Table 2)
[63,67].
In arguing for its preferred excise tax system, PM also tried to
‘‘resist any linkage by governments’’ [108] of health objectives to
tobacco taxes, probably because this linkage is recognised by
Tobacco Industry Influence in the Czech Republic
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TTCs as providing a rationale for governments to increase tax
and/or ‘‘earmark’’ revenue for health programmes [16].
Outcomes of TTC influence on excise during
privatisation. Although PM did not achieve its ultimate aim
of a single-rate specific excise structure, it still successfully
influenced excise policy in its favour during the early to mid
1990s, most notably by increasing the tax on short cigarettes and
thereby narrowing the difference between the tiers. According to
market reports, this appears to have had a direct impact on sales
and market shares. The sale of short cigarettes fell rapidly in the
mid-1990s, with king-size (i.e. larger, generally international
cigarettes [109,110]) coming to hold over three-quarters of the
market [59]. By 2000, PM had achieved an 80% market share
(Figure 1) [59].
Table 2. Cigarette excise structures and levels in Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic, 1989–2009.
Period
(Month/Year)
Ad valorem tax
(% of TIRSP1)
Specific tax
(CK2 per 1000)
VAT3
(%TIRSP)
Minimum
Tax level
(CK per 1000)
1989 71% of turnover4 n/a n/a n/a
1990 No filter: 67% turnover
With filter: 75% turnover
Sparta (the most popular brand): 84%
turnover
n/a n/a n/a
1991 n/a 3 tiers based on length & origin
,70 mm: 270
.70 mm: 460
Import: 830
n/a n/a
1992 n/a 3 tiers based on length & origin
,70 mm: 340
.70 mm: 575
Import: 1040
n/a n/a
Jan/1993 n/a 2 tiers based on length
,70 mm: 270
.70 mm: 460
23 n/a
Aug/1993 n/a ,70 mm: 360
.70 mm: 460
23 n/a
1994 n/a ,70 mm: 400
.70 mm: 500
23 n/a
1995 n/a ,70 mm: 400
.70 mm: 500
22 n/a
1996 n/a ,70 mm: 550
.70 mm: 650
22 n/a
1997 n/a ,70 mm: 550
.70 mm: 650
22 n/a
1998 n/a ,70 mm: 640
.70 mm: 740
22 n/a
Jan/1999 n/a ,70 mm: 640
.70 mm: 740
22 n/a
July/1999–July/2001 n/a ,70 mm: 670
.70 mm: 790
22 n/a
Aug/2001–Dec/2003 22 360 22 790
Jan/2004 23 480 22 ,70 mm: 900
.70 mm: 960
May/20045 23 480 19 940
July/2005 24 600 19 1130
April/2006 25 730 19 1360
March/2007 27 880 19 1640
Jan/2008 28 1030 19 1920
Feb/2010 28 1070 20 2010
Source: [97,162,163,164,165,166,167,168,204,205,206,207,208].
1TIRSP stands for Retail Selling Price, all Taxes included.
2CK stands for Czech Koruna, the official currency of the Czech Republic.
3VAT stands for Value Added Tax.
4‘turnover’ is equivalent to wholesale price.
5The length of cigarettes is no longer relevant after this date (NB length based taxation was in place to 2001 (on an ad valorem basis), were removed between August
2001 and December 2003, but in early 2004 were reapplied on a specific basis).
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001248.t002
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Influence on Excise Policy during EU Accession
EU accession required the Czech Republic to implement all EU
legislation including EU tobacco tax directives [6]. As such, it was
required to implement the EU’s minimum excise requirement (a
57% excise tax rate on the Most Popular Price Category [111])
and to put a mixed excise system in place. In the Czech Republic,
this required increasing tobacco taxation levels and adding an ad
valorem element to the existing specific excise tax. Efforts to
influence excise policy during the accession process focused on
these two issues.
Delaying implementation of the EU minimum excise
requirement. In late 1993, aware of the requirement for EU
accession states to implement EU tobacco tax directives, the TTCs
operating in these countries attempted to overcome their rivalries
and develop a united position on tax issues [112,113]. They
recognised that ‘‘lack of industry coordination in communicating
with relevant officials’’ [113] on tax issues had previously
undermined the industry’s credibility [112,113], and could induce
governments to ‘‘act against the long-term interests of… the
industry’’ [92]. BAT, which was generally in favour of mixed
excise systems (see above), was particularly forthright about the
benefits of a united approach, claiming this was ‘‘the most effective
way to improve industry and BAT [’s] control’’ in the acceding
countries [114]. TTCs began discussing tax issues at Eastern
Europe Working Group meetings around 1993 [92,115,116] and
subsequently established the Central Europe Tax Task Force
[113] to promote a ‘‘consistent approach and argumentation’’
[113,117]. In 1996, the Central Europe Tax Task Force began
working to achieve united tax harmonisation goals in Central
European countries, including the Czech Republic [113,117,118].
One important, unanimously agreed goal of the Central Europe
Tax Task Force was to oppose any large-scale increases in total tax
incidence [117,118,119]. Accordingly, the TTCs aimed to obtain a
5-year derogation period for the Czech Republic’s requirement to
implement the 57% minimum excise requirement [114,119],
expressing concerns about ‘‘unsustainable price increases’’ [120]
and heightened risks of smuggling [120]. A note of a Working
Group meeting in February 1996 indicates that members planned
to suggest to governments of the Central and East European
countries that the 57% minimum requirement might be reduced
[120], although we could find no evidence to support this claim. In
fact, the history of the development of EU tax directives shows that
excise levels have consistently increased, rather than fallen, over
time [121]. Later in 1996, all members of the Central Europe Tax
Task Force agreed to avoid endorsing, or even mentioning, the 57%
minimum requirement when lobbying (see Table 3 for a more
detailed overview of the arguments TTCs planned to use to
promote the need for derogation) [118,119]. The industry’s desire to
avoid any major increases in tax (and thus price) is consistent with
financial analyst reports, which indicate that small, gradual tax
increases can actually benefit the industry [122,123]. Analysts
suggest this is because, unlike large tax increases, incremental
increases have relatively little impact on consumption and can also
enable overshifting (where TTCs increase prices on top of the excise
increases, thus increasing profits) [124]. TTCs’ strong preference for
gradual tax increases was acknowledged in two separate interviews:
‘‘They [the TTCs] did not mind gradual increases [during
EU accession], but they feared major jumps. They said: if
you want an increase by, say, 20%, break it down to 5% a
time. But that’s a scam. It would be easier for family budgets
to adjust to a gradual increase… They knew a smoker would
resist for two or three days and then cave in. But they [were]
afraid of a significant jump, which would mobilise the
smokers to quit smoking.’’ (Anonymous, ex-MP).
‘‘[T]he Czechs know that our fiscal situation is such that
taxes will simply go up. The trick is not to do this in jumps
but via gradual provisions because the market will get used
to it.’’ (Economist and consultant to Czech political parties)
Figure 1. Cigarette sales by volume (in millions) overall and by company in the Czech Republic, 2000–2010. [169]
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001248.g001
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PM commissioned Arthur D. Little International (a consultancy
company TTCs often used [125]) to conduct an economic impact
study to counter proposals for excise increases in the Czech
Republic [126]. The study, published in 2000, claimed that the
Czech government gained six billion Czech Koruna (approxi-
mately US $150 million) from high smoking rates in 1999, due to
the reduced healthcare and social costs caused by the early deaths
of smokers [126,127]. This study was subsequently criticised from
both economic [128,129] and moral perspectives [130,131], and
PM was forced to make a public apology [130,132,133].
Disagreements on implementing the mixed tax
structure. Although the Central Europe Tax Task Force
acknowledged that a mixed system was required [118], in line with
the differences in brand portfolios outlined above, the TTCs had
different views as to what mix was preferable [117,119]. Despite
agreeing to push for derogation on the EU’s required minimum
level of taxation, the industry could not agree on how quickly
harmonisation of tax structures should occur in pre-accession,
Central European countries [113,118]. PM wanted to maintain a
fully specific system for as long as possible in the Czech Republic
and planned to lobby separately on this [134]. BAT, whose focus on
cheaper brands [135] would benefit from a system incorporating an
ad valorem element (Table 1), preferred faster harmonisation with
the EU mixed tax structure [113]. This rift motivated BAT and PM
to pursue separate avenues of excise policy influence in the Czech
Republic, while also continuing to meet as an industry group.
In 1996, having confirmed ‘‘the legal allowance of political
contribution’’ [136], PM organised a ‘‘contribution’’ [137] totalling
$300,000 to three Czech political parties that it felt were ‘‘consistently
pro-free trade and pro-market economy’’ [138] and ‘‘pursued
reasonable politics on excise taxation’’ [138]. These were the three
dominant political parties at that time: the Civic Democratic Party
(then the senior Government coalition party, led by Vaclav Klaus,
then Prime Minister), the Christian and Democratic Union -
Czechoslovak People’s Party (the second largest party in the
Government coalition), and the Civic Democratic Alliance Party (a
junior coalition party which held the posts of Minister of Trade and
Industry, Minister of Privatisation, and Head of the National
Property Fund) [138]. As highlighted by one interviewee:
‘‘They were very clever about it because they made
contributions to all [important] parties so that all of them
would be in their debt.’’ (Anonymous, ex-MP)
According to an investigation widely quoted in the Czech
media, PM (alongside two steel companies) deliberately sought to
obscure the origin of these donations by channelling them through
an offshore account [139,140] (e.g. see footnote 13, p289 in
reference 140), a claim which resulted in the resignation of the
Deputy Prime Minister, Jiri Skalicky [141,142,143]. Two inter-
viewees suggested that transparency in donations to political
parties and individual MPs is an ongoing concern.
‘‘Today, unfortunately, the political parties no longer make
their sponsors’ names public… It’s most probably continuing,
but in a way we know nothing about.’’ (Public Health Advocate)
‘‘I remember them [TTCs] paying for something for the
MPs, but I can’t remember the details now, and we stand no
chance of ever finding out. These are experienced people,
and they know how to do their business.’’ (Ex-MP)
BAT appears to have focused its lobbying at the EU level,
convening a board-level lobbying visit to the European Commis-
sion in November 1997, where they held a series of meetings with
high-level European Commission officials, including officials in the
Directorate-General for Internal Market and Services and the
Directorate-General for Customs and Indirect Taxation, Irish
Commissioner Padraig Flynn, United Kingdom Permanent
Representative staff and the Vice-President of the European
Commission, Sir Leon Brittan [144,145,146,147,148,149,150,151,
152,153,154,155,156,157]. These meetings were designed to
facilitate useful, long-term EU connections and signal BAT’s
importance in Europe [144]. BAT also planned to claim that their
business in Eastern Europe suffered from ‘‘arbitrary policy-making
in key areas, particularly taxation’’ [144] and that BAT therefore
supported ‘‘early enlargement’’ [144] of the EU to expedite adoption
of the EU’s mixed tobacco excise structure [144]. BAT further
planned to offer its ‘‘world-wide expertise’’ [144] on taxation issues
to officials in the accession countries and to present itself as a ‘‘neutral
partner’’ [144] of the EU and its member states. Our interview data
suggest that TTCs are continuing to position themselves as experts
on tobacco taxation who can ‘‘educate’’ less-knowledgeable officials:
‘‘You must generate long-lasting relations and you must
offer them some specific knowledge. Tobacco tax is a very
complex business. There are 200 people in the [Czech]
Table 3. The tobacco companies’ agreed tax harmonization goals and arguments for Central European countries (Czech Republic,
Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania).
Goals Arguments
Oppose any further large-scale increase in
total tax incidence [118,119]
N Large price increases driven by a rapid tax increase would heighten the risk of smuggling.
[120]
N Smuggling could reduce government revenue from tax; therefore no guarantee that a
revenue increase would result from EU harmonisation. [120]
N A review of the minimum excise tax level by the European Commission is due in 1996, thus
the target level of 57% may be reduced by 2000. [120]
Oppose the requirement of EU’s 57% minimum
excise level [118,119]
N Avoid promoting, endorsing or even mentioning this requirement when lobbying
governments [118,119]
Push for derogation in the implementation of the
EU minimum excise incidence of 57%, for at least 5 years
after integration to the EU [114,119]
N The EU White Paper on Central and Eastern Europe encourages gradual adoption of EU
legislations and preservation of macro-economic stability during the EU accession process.
[120]
N Rapid restructuring of the tax systems would result in unsustainable price increases, which
could seriously damage the economies of the accession countries. [120]
N The EU permits acceding countries to request derogations. [120]
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001248.t003
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House of Representatives who have all kinds of professions
(one is a doctor, another an engine driver, another an
engineer). How many of those understand consumer tax on
tobacco?’’ (Anonymous, tobacco industry employee)
In 1998, BAT succeeded in persuading other TTCs to agree on
the ‘‘BAT path of thinking regarding tax in Central Europe’’
[158], despite PM’s disdain for a mixed structure. Minutes of a
BAT-led Central Europe Tax Task Force meeting in January
1998 state PM, Reemtsma, RJR, and BAT unanimously agreed to
cooperate on supporting the implementation of a mixed tax
structure which complied with EU requirements [159].
Outcomes of TTC influence on excise during acces-
sion. The Czech Republic was granted two derogation periods
on tobacco excise levels when it officially joined the EU in May
2004: 32 months to raise the minimum level to 57% and 44 months
to increase the minimum level to 64 euro/1000 cigarettes in the
Most Popular Priced Category. This represented a partial success
for TTCs, as they had hoped to achieve a five-year derogation
period. No derogation was granted on implementing the mixed
structure [160], which was consistent with BAT’s preference, and as
of 01 August 2001, a mixed structure (i.e. with both ad valorem and
specific components; see Table 2) was introduced.
The TTCs’ shares of the tobacco market in the Czech Republic
have changed dramatically since the 2001 change from a specific to a
mixed tobacco excise regime. PM’s market share dropped from
around 80% in 2000 to under 50% in 2010, while BAT’s share more
than doubled to 21% (Figure 1) [59,161,162,163,164,165,166,167,
168,169,170,171]. While these changes are consistent with the mixed
excise structure advantaging BAT over PM, other factors may have
also played a role. First, EU accession in 2004 enabled TTCs to
supply cigarettes from any production base in the EU without
incurring import duties, effectively removing most of the benefits
previously associated with local production [59,172]. This appears to
have prompted BAT and PM to close domestic production facilities
in the Czech Republic in July 2004 and 2005, respectively [59,173];
BAT is now supplying the Czech market solely by imports, while PM
retains production at its Kutna Hora factory [59]. Second, in line
with trends elsewhere in Europe, an economy cigarette sector quickly
emerged around this time [59] and has continued to grow (Figure 2)
[174]. This could also have hurt PM’s market share as its strategy
focused on pushing premium brands, although some analysts suggest
PM’s failure to improve sales may be attributable to its altered
distribution system [59].
Despite five relatively small excise tax increases between EU
accession in 2004 and 2010 [59,171], cigarettes are becoming
increasingly more affordable due to rising income levels (Figure 3).
TTCs are taking advantage of this situation by overshifting tax
increases and thus increasing profits [174]. Nevertheless, cigarette
prices remain low [8] and the country’s current tobacco excise
yield is one of the lowest in the EU [170].
Given the ineffectiveness of tobacco excise policy in the Czech
Republic, it is unsurprising that smoking prevalence rates have
changed little since 2000 [175,176] and that cigarette sales
increased between 2000 and 2007 (Figure 1). Although they have
since fallen, this decline has been largely attributed to market
conditions rather than tobacco control policies [171,174].
Continued TTC Influence in the Czech Republic: Interview
Data
Since joining the EU, the TTCs have continued their intensive
lobbying efforts in the Czech Republic (various interviews), with
PM viewed as the most active (interview, civil servant). Political
support for the industry appears to be higher than in many
European countries with, for example, one of our interviewees
arguing that s/he ‘‘didn’t see a problem with’’ President Klaus’
decision to open the PM’s new factory (Czech Member of the
European Parliament).
Our interviews provide examples of how PM and the other
TTCs continue to court high-level politicians, at both the national
and the EU levels, sometimes disguising their involvement:
‘‘I was once invited [last year] to a round-table conference to
which legislation experts, customs officers, and the Ministry
were invited, and there were representatives from tobacco
companies too. It was under the auspices of some training
company, but in my opinion, it was the tobacco people who
organised it.’’ (Anonymous, civil servant)
‘‘Last week, there was a social event in Malostranska´ Beseda
[177] organised by Phillip Morris, in which 54 MPs and
Senators participated… …We never had 54 come to our
[tobacco control] seminars. One or two, maybe…There are
200 MPs and 81 Senators, so 54 is a good amount.’’ (Public
health advocate)
Other interviewees mentioned this expensive reception, one
noting that at least one minister attended. Furthermore, one
interviewee named three high-level politicians and two members of
the presidential team who ‘‘represent the views of the industry’’
(interview, public health advocate), suggesting that industry efforts to
court political support remain successful. Interestingly, the tobacco
industry interviewee was very keen for us to interview one of these
politicians, Senator Kubera, who regularly campaigns against Czech
tobacco control proposals [178,179,180,181], claiming:
‘‘Senator Kubera knows about smoking issues about 15 times
more than does Dr. Sˇtˇastny´ [an MP currently campaigning
for an earmarked excise tax on cigarettes to fund health care].
In any case, his view of the issues is much more relevant than
that of Sˇtˇastny´.’’ (Tobacco industry employee)
Discussion
This paper documents extensive evidence of tobacco industry
policy influence in the Czech Republic, including over the
privatisation process, tobacco advertising, tax levels, and structure.
This detailed case study is important as it elucidates industry
influence on tax policies, which have not been well researched
outside North America [16]. The findings are likely to be particularly
relevant for other Eastern Europe countries, many of which
experienced similar economic reforms and a process of tobacco
industry privatisation around the same time as Czechoslovakia/the
Czech Republic. More broadly, the findings draw attention to a
range of strategies for influencing policy and gaining market share
that tobacco companies may employ in emerging markets. Both
privatisation and EU accession provided opportunities for TTC
influence. PM was most successful in exploiting the former and BAT
the latter, and the successes are reflected in subsequent market share
trends (Figures 1 and 2). It is also clear that the industry continues to
enjoy high-level political support and access, to a degree that is now
rare in many other parts of Europe [182,183].
On privatisation, we demonstrate that PM attempted to avoid a
competitive tender and, having effectively established a production
monopoly, sought to influence the monopoly legislation to
preclude competition. This substantiates previous evidence that
TTCs may attempt to establish monopolies [5], whilst simulta-
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neously extolling the benefits of free market competition [64]. This
conduct was previously documented only for BAT [10,105,184],
but this paper provides evidence of PM acting in the same way.
On advertising, we show that TTCs worked hard to prevent
and undermine advertising legislation between 1989 and 1995,
ignoring initial legislation and supplanting further proposals for
binding advertising bans with a voluntary approach. This is a
tactic TTCs have used elsewhere [5,185,186,187] and reveals a
consistent industry preference for voluntary over binding controls
on marketing [186].
In relation to tobacco excise policy, we document a number of
important findings with key relevance for policy. First, in relation to
tax levels, both PM and BAT generally aimed for low excise levels.
This was particularly so at the point of market entry, when PM was
even willing to absorb taxes in order to ensure its brands remained
affordable (i.e. to undershift tobacco taxes)—a TTC tactic
documented elsewhere [188]. On EU accession, it is clear the
industry made concerted and successful efforts to delay the excise
increases required. Indeed cigarettes became more affordable post-
accession (Figure 3). This indicates that opportunities to improve
tobacco control were missed during the accession process, a point
that has been previously made [6]. Second, the TTCs angled for
gradual, small tax increases (as opposed to intermittent, large
increases). This practice is documented during both privatisation
and accession and is noted by at least one interviewee. Our data
suggest this is because intermittent, large increases are more likely to
prompt smokers to quit: a finding consistent with reports of very
substantial declines in cigarette consumption following large tax
increases in France, Germany and Ukraine [189,190]. This
indicates that intermittent, large tax increases would be more
effective as a public health strategy—an issue that requires further
research. Third, data show that the industry is currently overshifting
tax increases (i.e. increasing cigarette prices, and thus profits, on top
of the excise increase) in the Czech Republic. This represents extra
profits for TTCs and a lost opportunity for the government, which
could have collected this additional revenue as tax. Moreover, the
fact that TTCs are overshifting taxes goes against their advice to the
government to keep prices low.
In relation to excise structures, our findings support existing
studies [16] in suggesting that each TTC had a standard approach
to excise structure, with PM promoting a specific structure,
designed to narrow the price gap between Marlboro and cheaper
brands, and BAT promoting a mixed system, to aid its cheaper
brands and disadvantage PM.
To achieve policy influence, TTCs targeted key government
officials at both national and EU levels, as they have done elsewhere
[10,105,191,192], sometimes exploiting a lack of political and policy
expertise in tobacco excise as an opportunity to ‘‘educate’’
politicians. Our interviewees suggest this tactic continues and
extends to high-level politicians with whom the industry appears to
enjoy significant contact and influence. Political donations to
‘‘friendly’’ political parties were used behind cover, with transpar-
ency of political funding identified as an ongoing concern. Other
tactics include trying to ensure favourable media coverage and
commissioning third-party research to boost credibility of the
industry claims; again, tactics noted elsewhere [105,193,194].
It is worth noting that for some issues, TTCs’ approach and
argumentation appear to be context-specific (although always with
Figure 2. Volume market share by price segment in the Czech Republic, 2004–2009. [174]
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001248.g002
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the ultimate aim of securing corporate advantage, including over
competitors). For example, PM supported a tax stamp system in
the Czech Republic, once it had secured a dominant position, just
as BAT did in Uzbekistan [10]. Yet, elsewhere, PM has lobbied
against such a system [105]. This differing stance is explained by
the fact that tax stamps protect the interest of dominant TTCs
with a domestic base by making it more difficult for their
competitors to import tobacco products (including illegally).
Market research reports suggest the tax stamp system, and later
a ban on selling tobacco from street markets, were effective in
limiting the illicit tobacco trade [59].
Empirical evidence suggests several of the arguments developed by
TTCs to influence excise policy were misleading. For example, in
seeking to delay the implementation of the EU’s minimum excise
requirement, TTCs planned to argue that raising taxes would increase
smuggling. Yet, in reality, the evidence indicates that smuggling is
more pervasive in countries with low tobacco tax and loose border
regulation [195,196]. TTCs also agreed to contend that increased
tobacco taxes could reduce government revenue, when evidence
indicates that tobacco tax increases almost always increase govern-
ment revenue [197]. Furthermore, the TTCs aimed to exploit the
argument that the implementation of tax increases to meet the EU’s
57% minimum excise level must be gradual in order to preserve the
country’s macro-economic stability. In reality, it is unlikely that
changes in taxation of tobacco, which is not an essential good [14],
would have a significant impact on a country’s overall economy [190].
The TTCs’ desire for gradual tax increases is more likely to relate to
their awareness (as described above) that gradual increases are more
easily absorbed by consumers. The fact that a significant derogation
period was granted to the Czech Republic in relation to the EU
minimum excise requirement (albeit a shorter period than the TTCs
were hoping for) suggests the TTCs were relatively successful in
influencing this process, despite the flawed nature of their arguments.
The chief negotiator of the Czech Republic’s accession to the EU was
Pavel Telicˇka, a former Member of the European Parliament who
now works as a lobbyist in Brussels for large companies [198] and as
BAT’s EU Social Reporting Facilitator [193].
An important limitation of this study is that the document
analysis was based primarily on PM and BAT documents, for the
reasons explained in the Methods section. We also found very little
information regarding the role played by civil society groups in the
development of tobacco control policies in the Czech Republic.
We found no industry documents on non-governmental organi-
zations’ activities in relation to tobacco advertising or taxation.
One document even suggests that industry perceived tobacco
control activity to be almost nonexistent in the immediate post-
communist period [199]. Although the literature suggests that
tobacco-control activities had increased by the late 1990s
[200,201], policy advocacy efforts are reported as limited [202],
reflecting the ‘‘lack of tradition in civic participation’’ [202].
Overall, our findings suggest that tobacco industry influence
plays a key part in explaining the weak tobacco control policies of
Figure 3. Price of, and the percentage of average salary needed to buy, one pack of cigarettes in the Czech Republic, 1991–2008. [97]
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001248.g003
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the Czech Republic. Improvements in tobacco control will
probably be possible only if efforts are made to protect policies
from the vested interests of the tobacco industry, as enshrined in
Article 5.3 of the FCTC [203], and if public and political attitudes
to the industry shift. Transparency in political funding and greater
policy advocacy by civil society groups could be important steps
towards achieving such a shift. More specifically, our findings
point to a number of policy recommendations, particularly in
relation to tobacco excise policy (Box 1).
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Editors’ Summary
Background. Every year, about 5 million people die from
tobacco-related diseases and, if current trends continue,
annual tobacco-related deaths will increase to 10 million by
2030. Faced with this global tobacco epidemic, national and
international bodies have drawn up conventions and
directives designed to control tobacco. For example,
European Union (EU) Directives on tobacco control call for
member states to ban tobacco advertising, promotion, and
sponsorship and to adopt taxation policies (for example,
high levels of tobacco excise tax) aimed at reducing tobacco
consumption. Within the EU, implementation of tobacco
control policies varies widely but the Czech Republic, which
was formed in 1993 when Czechoslovakia split following the
1989 collapse of communism, has a particularly poor record.
The Czech Republic, which joined the EU in 2004, is the only
EU Member State not to have ratified the World Health
Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control,
which entered into force in 2005, and its tobacco control
policies were the fourth least effective in Europe in 2010.
Why Was This Study Done? During the communist era,
state-run tobacco monopolies controlled the supply of
cigarettes and other tobacco products in Czechoslovakia.
Privatization of these monopolies began in 1991 and several
transnational tobacco companies (TTCs)—in particular, Philip
Morris and British American Tobacco—entered the tobacco
market in what was to become the Czech Republic. In this
socio-historical study, which aims to improve understanding
of both effective tobacco excise policy and the ways in which
TTCs seek to influence policy in emerging markets, the
researchers analyze publically available internal TTC docu-
ments and interview key informants to examine efforts made
by TTCs to influence tobacco advertising and tobacco excise
tax policies in the Czech Republic. A socio-historical study
examines the interactions between individuals and groups in
a historical context.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? The researchers
analyzed 511 documents (dated 1989 onwards) in the
Legacy Tobacco Documents Library website (a collection of
internal tobacco industry documents released through US
litigation cases) that mentioned tobacco control policies in
the Czech Republic. They also analyzed information obtained
from sources such as tobacco industry journals and data
obtained in 2010 in interviews with key Czech informants
(including a tobacco industry representative and a politician).
The researchers’ analysis of the industry documents indicates
that Philip Morris ignored, overturned, and weakened
attempts to restrict tobacco advertising and promoted
voluntary approaches as an alternative to binding legislation.
Importantly, while the internal documents show that Philip
Morris lobbied for a specific excise tax (a fixed amount of tax
per cigarette, a tax structure that favors the expensive
brands that Philip Morris mainly markets), the European
strategy employed at that time by British American Tobacco
was to lobby for a mixed excise structure that combined an
‘‘ad valorem’’ tax (a tax levied as a proportion of price) and a
specific tax, an approach that favors a mixed portfolio of
tobacco brands. By contrast, the documents show that TTCs
collaborated in trying to keep tobacco taxes low and in
trying to prevent any large tax increases. This collective
lobbying successfully delayed the tobacco tax increases
required as a condition of the Czech Republic’s accession to
the EU. Finally, the interview data suggest that TTCs had
high-level political support in the Czech Republic and
continue actively to attempt to influence policy.
What Do These Findings Mean? These findings provide
clear evidence that Philip Morris and British American
Tobacco (the two TTCs that have dominated the Czech
market since privatization of the tobacco industry) have
significantly influenced tobacco advertising and excise policy
in the Czech Republic since 1989. The findings, which also
suggest that this influence is ongoing, help to explain the
Czech Republic’s poor tobacco control record, which was
reflected in a fall in the real price of cigarettes between 1990
and 2000. More generally, this study provides valuable
insight into how TTCs might try to influence policy in other
emerging markets. Improvements in global tobacco control,
the researchers conclude, will be possible only if efforts are
made to protect tobacco control policies from the vested
interests of the tobacco industry, a principle enshrined in the
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco control, and if
public and political attitudes to the industry shift.
Additional Information. Please access these Web sites via
the online version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.
1371/journal.pmed.1001248.
N The World Health Organization provides information about
the dangers of tobacco (in several languages) and about its
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
N For information about the tobacco industry’s influence on
policy, see the 2009 World Health Organization report
‘‘Tobacco interference with tobacco control’’
N The Framework Convention Alliance more information
about the FCTC
N Details of European Union legislation on excise duty
applied to manufactured tobacco and on the manufacture,
presentation and sale of tobacco products are available (in
several languages)
N The Legacy Tobacco Documents Library is a searchable
public database of tobacco company internal documents
detailing their advertising, manufacturing, marketing,
sales, and scientific activities
N The UK Centre for Tobacco Control Studies is a network of
UK universities that undertakes original research, policy
development, advocacy, and teaching and training in the
field of tobacco control
N SmokeFree, a website provided by the UK National Health
Service, offers advice on quitting smoking and includes
personal stories from people who have stopped smoking
N Smokefree.gov, from the US National Cancer Institute,
offers online tools and resources to help people quit
smoking and not start again
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